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In this paper – based on our past research – we have set ourselves the goal of 
testing the following hypothesis.  Our basic assumption is that  the fundamental 
precondition for the due protection of  private property is personal immunity in the 
broad sense, i.e. guarantees of rights such as the protection of life, personal freedoms 
and  the  inviolability  of  private property, including  the requisite  institutions for the 
enforcement of the same, often conceived of in political terms. 
The growth spurts  achieved in  authoritarian countries proved to be 
unsustainable. Rule of Law regimes which provide personal immunity and property 
guaranties for all economic agents consistently  outperform all competing forms of 
socio-political organization  in  the  Long Run. Indeed, these countries  have always 
proved to be the source and accelerant for growth  in all other economies, providing 
them  with knowledge, capitals, and  sometimes,  by  exporting their advanced 
institutions to underdeveloped countries. 
Figure 1  shows historical economic growth sustainability  – how often the 
country in question increased its per capita GDP yearly at a sustainable rate
1.  
For instance, taking the cases of Belgium and Argentina, with yearly growth 
rate observations  for  a period of  101 years:  depressions  greater than  -20%  – 0 
instances for both countries; -20 to -15% a year – two instances in the case of Belgium 
and one in the case of Argentina; -15 to -10% – once instance in the Belgian case etc. 
The  graph  clearly  shows  that Argentina more often  achieved yearly growth rates 
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1 For the period 1900 - 2001 (Maddison, 2003)   3 
Figure 2  shows the cases of two Rule of Law democracies,  Belgium and 
Denmark, as compared to two catch-up development cases, Cuba and Argentina. The 
figures  clear  demonstrate  that  the  probability of depression for  a  Rule of Law 
democracy  is  significantly lower than for catch-up developing countries.  The 


















To date, history has provided no basis to suggest that any favorable “starting 
conditions”, or “initial capital”, or “impulse” are capable of securing long  term 
economic growth over a period of centuries (with average rates of 1.5 – 2% or more 
per  capita GDP growth) in the absence of “reasonable laws”
2.  This inquiry  can 
therefore  be  largely  reduced to the question  of  which laws  are to be regarded as 
reasonable, and what package of such laws might be said to constitute a satisfactory, or 
at least minimal, prerequisite for growth.   
In the course of our research we had to  formulate  certain definitions and 
concepts.   
Constitution — a set of basic values and norms, deeply rooted and accepted by 
an overwhelming majority of agents,
3 relating to the interaction between these agents, 
as well as to their responsibilities and rights and their relationships with Government, 
both formal and informal, which can either be altered only at great cost
4, or not be 
altered at all
5. 
                                                 
2 1.5% over a period of 180 years would have been sufficient to transform a country, not affluent even by the 
standards of the late 18
th century (such as China with a per-capita GDP of 600 USD in 1990), into a country 
of a medium level of development (like the Czech Republic or Argentina). At a rate of 2%, however, it 
would have taken 200 years for an extremely backward African country with a per-capita GDP of 400 USD 
in the early 19
th century to become a highly developed one, with a per-capita GDP exceeding that of France, 
Finland and Belgium in 2000.  
3 It follows that such norms are those that may be employed with minimum (close to zero) cost.  
4 Such changes take decades, at a minimum. 
5 The Biblical values which lay at the foundation of American institutions, for example, cannot be altered. In accordance 
with the above definition, changes to the US Constitution–not as a formal judicial act, but rather as an aggregate of   4 
Rule-of-Law  (RoL)  societies and countries  — societies governed in 
accordance with well known and published legal norms, based on the priority of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual over collective and state interests, 
providing the necessary guarantees of such rights and  the  implementation  thereof, 
including by force. 
Among such guarantees is the independence of the courts, provided for by laws 
and traditions, and evidenced by the fact that the State, represented by high officials 
and agencies, can not infrequently lose in a socially significant and widely publicized 
case to an individual citizen (many such examples may be easily accessed in press 
archives). An example of this is the US Supreme Court’s decision on the illegality of 
procedures for detaining terrorists at the Guantanamo military base,
6 which created 
serious problems for the US administration.  
Rule-of-Force countries  —  regimes  the “legitimacy” of which  are based 
exclusively on their ability and readiness to resort to violence, and their application of 
force  in critical situations. In  such societies, institutionalized laws and norms are 
replaced by “direct action” mechanisms, such as law enforcement agencies endowed 
with extraordinary powers and discretion which are above and beyond the law. 
Basic individual
7 rights and freedoms — such as private property ownership, 
including the freedom of entrepreneurship and pricing in the sphere of trade; personal 
immunity in the broad sense, including the right to life; the inviolability of persons 
publicly criticizing the authorities or professing religious values not approved of by the 
authorities.  These principles correspond to the “natural rights” as developed by J. 
Locke.  
Basic institutions  —  law-enforcement structures guaranteeing the 
implementation of basic rights and freedoms; an  independent judiciary (such as the 
non-removal of judges from office, the prohibitively high cost of so doing) etc.; the 
transparency of law enforcement agencies (judicial sanction of arrest etc.). 
            Free elections — it must be stressed that elections can only be so described 
where they  take place  under conditions of formal and actual freedom of unions, 
freedom of expression (evidenced by the existence of an opposition press, radio and 
TV
8), and where personal immunity is upheld in practice
9. 
Revealed demand for such institutions — evidenced by actions undertaken by 
the public or part thereof aimed at acquiring or defending certain institutions,  e.g. 
participation in  mass actions demanding the introduction or abolishment of certain 
norms
10. 
                                                                                                                                                   
norms–cannot be implemented in the medium term period. This is due to the fact that such amendments require the 
rather inert “soft infrastructure” to be changed. A majority of American leftists still consider voting rights to be linked to 
the payment of taxes–i.e. that “taxation” and “representation” are still inextricably related–despite the fact that said 
linkage was formally abolished by the 24
th Amendment in 1964.  
6 The decision on the Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld case, 04-702; the decision was announced on June, 29 2006. 
7 We of course reject the propagandist clichés concerning so-called “national” or “collective” “class” rights.  
8 The press is deemed to be an opposition force when it accuses the head of executive authority of illegal or 
immoral actions, or of inefficiency detrimental to society and country, or of inappropriate execution of his or 
her responsibilities in view of which he or she should be impeached or defeated in the coming elections – 
see Mau, Yanovskiy et al, 2007.  
9 Otherwise, the most effective electoral strategy would be that practiced by R. Taylor in Liberia: “He killed 
my Ma, he killed my Pa, I’ll vote for him” (see comment by Yanovskiy, Shulgin, Zatkovecky, 2007).    
10 As an action considered, for example, voting for the party, supporting or opposing to establishment of 
certain institutions, respective political activism (electoral campaign volunteering, donating, etc). The parties 
are formally classified according to their relationship to the Basic Institutions.   5 
The Question of Dependence and Causality 
The choice and elaboration of the essential set of institutions required for the 
support of long-term economic growth, as described by A. Smith, is still among the 
most fundamental problems of economic science.  
M. Olson pointed to freedom as a key precondition for economic growth, in as 
much as it tends to provide long-term transaction guarantees against even stationary 
bandit discretion. A number of researchers (W.Wo, O.Davis) have concluded that the 
existence of some causal relationship is unclear. Further research and discussion are 
therefore needed in order to bring this discussion to a conclusion.  
The task of catch-up development still confronts the majority of mankind. It 
is  for this reason that  taking the long view, a detailed description of more or less 
reliable routes and trajectories of such development is to be considered a matter of the 
utmost importance. In order to achieve this it is necessary to answer the following 
question: what needs to be copied, built, developed or obtained in  some other way 
(capital, knowledge, reasonable laws, etc…) in order that an economy may embark on 
a course of long-term growth at a sustainable and stable rate, exceeding that of 
developed countries. Or are, perhaps, the institutions of rule-of-law democracies and 
notions of personal liberties simply luxuries available only to the rich?  
An analysis of the recent history of post-socialist countries, together with 
comparative institutional analyses covering a lengthy period of economic history (the 
last  century),  would seem  to provide an  answer  to  these questions.  Successful 
catching-up cannot be guaranteed by an influx of capital (or investments) alone. Nor is 
the import (or stealing) of know-how and technologies  sufficient in and of itself. 
Without the  importation of efficient institutions,  such steps  will ultimately prove 
unproductive. 
Which institutions are efficient? Under what conditions? Based on earlier 
studies of data concerning institutions in post-communist countries, as well as on the 
basis of data pertaining to current Russian institutions (Mau, Yanovskiy, 2002; Mau, 
Yanovskiy, Zhavoronkov, 2003), we have arrived at the following conclusions. It is 
indeed  possible to experiment with legislation  relating to entrepreneurship 
(registration, licensing and bankruptcy), taxation or regulation of the stock market, as 
well as many other factors. However, the effect of these steps has been found to be 
rather limited during the first decades of transition. At the same time it is apparent that 
there  is no room for compromise with regard to the accelerated establishment and 
constant strengthening of the basic institutions which are conducive to a combination 
of private property rights and the rights and inviolability of the individual (personal 
immunity in the broad sense). 
These conclusions were arrived at,  in the first place, on the basis of 
comparative analysis (including statistical analysis) of  institutions in post-communist 
countries during the 1990s (Mau, Yanovskiy, Zhavoronkov et al., 2003).   
The question of the influence of institutions on economic growth, other than 
that exerted by  the  institution of private property  regarding which  there is broad 
consensus, is generally examined on the basis of a larger number of countries than the 
number of post-communist nations. The circle of researchers dealing with  this issue 
has been steadily expanding in recent decades.  
R. Barro (Barro, 1999) stressed the issue of the rule of law (Rule of Law 
Index which is based on ratings and on expert opinion) and (1999,  (2)) based his 
analysis on the Lipset’s (1994) vision of the Democracy origins. Lipset supposed that 
the Democracy is caused and supported by sustainable economic development and 
political culture maturity.   6 
Later, K. Okui ( Okui, 2005)  demonstrated the absence of  a  statistical 
connection indicating the interdependence of political and economic rights. The same 
view is shared by W. Wo, whose conclusions are based on his methodology for 
analyzing and testing mutual influence and causality (Wo, 2005). It should be noted 
that the absence of  a  statistical connection may be explained by the existence of 
complex cause-effect relationships between institutions and economic growth.   
It is vital to note that the relative importance and direction of causality may 
vary from one society to another due to different levels of development. According to 
a number of researchers, the demand for institutions typical of rule-of-law democracies 
tends to take root  among a  significant  percentage of the population only after a 
sufficiently high level of per-capita GDP  has  been a chieved  (V. Mau and I. 
Starodubrovskaia, 2001).   
As noted above, Olson, who was convinced that the direction of causality is 
from democracy to economic growth, described one of the causes of this phenomenon 
(Olson, 2000). Long-term and complex transactions are sensitive to risk, to 
institutional peculiarities etc., and  it is  therefore  essential that property rights  are 
protected by ironclad  guarantees  which can  only  be ensured  in a  rule-of-law 
democracy. It follows, therefore, that persons who have achieved a certain  level of 
economic  success cannot  continue to thrive  when confronted by institutional 
limitations.  
At the individual level, a more obvious rationale leading to a demand for 
such institutions is the necessity to protect the level of wealth  and the accumulated 
resources already attained; the more numerous  the people with high incomes and 
substantial property, the higher the demand for such institutions
11. The driving power 
behind, and indeed the  leaders of, the English and American Revolutions were 
landowners. An awareness of these issues motivated the Finnish elite to redistribute 
portions of their estates in favor of the exiles from the Karelian Isthmus
12 in order to 
prevent their de-socialization and p olitical marginalization. Also, many politicians 
viewed the growth of  a class of property owners favorably, seeing them  as natural 
supporters of the irreversibility of market and democratic reforms.   
Next, we shall endeavor to single out those scientific schools and research 
centers where research into the impact of institutions on the economy has, in our view, 
produced significant results.  
The first is the school of classical liberals who congregate around the Cato 
and Fraser Institutes. Some of these researchers participated in the development of the 
economic freedom index. These indices are useful when attempting to evaluate the 
various theses regarding the causality of economic growth by economic and other 
freedoms. In Institutions and the Impact of Investment on Growth, a report presented at 
the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society in New Orleans, Gwartney and 
his colleagues (Holcombe, Gwartney, Lawson, 2005) substantiate the existence of an 
influence exerted by qualitative institutions (measured by the Economic Freedom of 
the World Index  – EFW) on economic growth by means of investments 
(predominantly private).  In their work they apply  the index of economic freedom 
(EFW) to data on economic growth during the period 1980-2000.   
                                                 
11 Thus, the stipulations of the Coase theorem concerning the presence of well-established property rights 
and zero transaction costs are predicated on the existence of a strong  rule-of-law State (or the necessity of 
its presence for achieving the optimum, outside the dependence on the initial distribution, which already 
exists under  rule-of-law democracy). 
12 Eric Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, editors. Finland: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library 
of Congress, 1988 http://countrystudies.us/finland/77.htm    7 
The largest and the most well financed project of this sort were funded by the 
World Bank over a period of 11 years. The data for the institutions quality assessment 
included political stability and the existence of a Rule of Law state based on public 
polls13 and experts’ evaluations (see Kaufmann et al, 2007). This is a clear indication 
that the WB’s board places considerable stock in the hypothesis of the direct causality 
of institutions’ quality on the economic growth rate. 
Another is the center founded by Olson,  the IRIS. (Since the death of its 
founder, P. Murrel and L. Polishchuk have been its leading researchers). Their 
research methodology is similar  to that of the Institute for Economy in Transition 
(IET).  Specifically, they use judicial statistics and take note of calculable indicators as 
opposed to indicators based on expert assessments.  Olson himself is firmly convinced 
that growth is favorably impacted by rights and freedoms. 
In their investigations regarding the impact of institutions on economic 
growth, Shleifer and his colleagues have focused on the institutions directly related to 
guarantees of private property, the financial market, judicial procedures (common and 
codified or "civil law") etc. At the same time, they also devote their attention to such 
basic institutions as the freedom of speech (Shleifer, Djankov et al., 2002). These 
researches  broadly  apply the standard indices of economic freedom based on the 
assessments of experts, as well as  on a sample based on  a very large number of 
countries which frequently distorts these assessments. (Thus, the differences between 
legal regulation in Switzerland and the USA are known to be much less than those 
between Switzerland and, for example, Syria, although both Switzerland and Syria are 
countries where continental law applies).   
D. Asemoglu and his colleagues conduct research based on historical context, 
which increases the comparability of analyses. The colonists’ survivability index, 
quoted so frequently  as an  indication of institutional leadership  that  it has almost 
become a classic, is too complex and includes too many variables. The assertion of its 
critics (Shleifer et al., 2004), however, that the key factor of the advantages enjoyed by 
the USA, Australia, Canada and other “white” colonies may be human capital and not 
institutional, is equally vulnerable. During the historical periods under consideration, 
the advantages of the Europeans with regard to education, production skills, and the 
mastering of technologies over the Indians, Arabs, or the Chinese are far from being 
clear cut. Even the settled tribes of Native Americans, as early as the 16
th and 17
th 
centuries, frequently  demonstrated  superior skills ( particularly  in  the field of 
agriculture,  where their advantage was  very considerable) as compared to  the first 
European colonists.  There can be no doubt, however, that  the abilities of  the 
Europeans in the  fields  of self-organization, coordination of action and  the 
establishment of efficient institutions based on well established moral principles were 
the secret of  their success. The line dividing between the institutional component and 
that of human capital seems therefore to be rather vague. 
It goes without saying that the authors and research centers mentioned above 
are not the only ones who have obtained noteworthy results in this field.   
The problem faced by the majority of the above listed authors (the least 
affected by it are Shleifer and his colleagues, and the IRIS-Center) is the reliance on 
indices which, although authoritative, are based on the assessment of experts and on 
ranking technologies.  
                                                 
13 The poll estimates the confidence in the police, judicial system and personal experience as the crime 
victim.  Other indicators were defined by the consulting experts.   8 
The IET’s approach to institutional studies is characterized by a) an attempt to 
toughen  the  broad interpretation of  compatibility requirements (which  necessarily 
limits the  number of  countries sampled), and  b) by  ditch  expert  assessments and 
replacing them with judicial statistics and sets of logical variables. It is our view that 
any  legal  norm  or  law-enforcement practice can be described by means of a finite 
number of variables, even though such description might require considerable time and 
effort. Moreover, our previous research (Mau, Yanovskiy, Zhavoronkov et al., 2002, 
2003) has caused us to recognize certain  institutions as fundamental and to therefore 
focus on these during the course of further analysis. We refer here to the right to life 
(or the risk of death at the hands of “roving” or “stationary” bandits),  personal 
immunity (including persons with non-traditional convictions who are critical of the 
authorities, the prevalent religion etc.) 
According to the extent to which these rights are guaranteed, it is possible to 
categorize a ll countries as either  RoL (Rule of Law)  countries  where  discrete 
regulation exists, or RoF (Rule of Force) countries.  
It is also possible to speak of countries in transition as a distinct and separate 
category.  
An overview of several papers devoted to the formal description of institutions 
and to an evaluation of their impact on economic growth and on investment climate, 
can be found in Mau, Yanovskiy, Zhavoronkov et al., 2003. 
This paper aimed to demonstrate the importance of those institutions ensuring 
guarantees of life and personal immunity by pointing out that, in the absence of these 
institutions, guarantees of universally recognized private property rights either cease to 
exist or are rendered meaningless. A person kept in detention and/or threatened with 
death, will, as a rule, agree to surrender any property rights he may have. Our research 
is predicated upon an important assumption as to the lexicographical character of 
demand (or preference) for life and freedom. We will attempt to substantiate this 
assumption by the following brief review.   
Clearly, even statistically significant interdependence cannot be adduced as 
proof; it is at best an illustration, showing the possibility of an interrelation or causal 
relation. We believe the most acceptable approach on which to found this position and 
support this hypothesis is a combination of statistical analysis and reasonable micro-
level interpretation of the economic agents’ incentives.  It is self evident that  the 
propensity of the overwhelming majority of agents is to attain the goods of life and to 
enjoy freedom, and that they attach to these aims the highest priority. We shall attempt 
to describe this phenomenon by way of examining HLV in the fields of life insurance 
and hostage trades.  
 
Human Life Value (HLV) 
 
Economic theory offers a number of approaches for the evaluation of human 
life. HLV is the present value of all future income that a person can expect to earn.   
In an “ideal” financial market, the HLV would reflect the maximum value of 
the borrowed funds available to a specific individual at a given moment. Such accurate 
estimations of the value of human life are utilized in the life insurance market, where 
the HLV represents a balanced estimation of the value of an insurance coverage in 
which both the insurer and the insured are mutually interested.   
The insured party is interested in paying the minimum rate in the event of a 
“favorable” outcome and in being paid the maximum rate in  the event of an 
“unfavorable” outcome, whereas the insuring party is interested in being paid the   9 
maximum rate in an event of a “favorable” outcome and in paying the minimum rate 
in the event of an “unfavorable” one.   
In some countries, a conditional assessment of human life value is 
established by legislation.  The US Ministry of Transportation uses the conditional 
estimation of human life value
14 when assessing the efficiency of investments in 
measures designed to ensure transport safety.  
In the context of the present work, it is the market (insurance market) 
assessments that are most relevant. These demonstrate that as far as the market agents 
are concerned, the assessment of the value of life is comparable with the value of all 
the assets owned.   
 
Demand for Health Care Services and Medical Insurance 
  
On this subject there exists a vast body of literature, including studies based 
on empirical data (e.g., Liu, Chollet, 2006). The methodologies and assessments differ 
considerably, but  all agree that  the  demand for such services is not elastic.  This 
phenomenon  has been observed even  in the young Chinese market (Mokan, Tekin, 
Zax, 2003). In Russia, the development of the health care services and the medical 
insurance market is clearly insufficient. During the Soviet period, health care services, 
although of  poor quality, were provided to the population free of charge and were 
widely available due to an incomparably higher standard of living and level of 
urbanization than that of China. In the post-Soviet period, this previous advantage in 
accessibility of free healthcare has considerably hampered the development of the 
health care services market. It is n evertheless a fact that the furtive proliferation of 
unauthorized commercial services began decades before the collapse of socialism. As 
might be expected, this hidden commercialization has been accelerating in recent 
years, which is yet another indirect testimony to the inflexible nature of the demand 
for health care services in Russia.   
 
Chechen Region.  Russia in the 20
th Century and Iraq Since 2003 
The trading of hostages during the 1990s in Russia – the center of this activity being in 
the de facto independent territory of Chechnya between 1991-94 and 1996-99 – is yet 
another confirmation of the fact that human life is assessed in relation not only to all 
the assets owned by a hostage, but also to all the assets owned by those who are 
potentially ready to assist in his liberation.  





The Level of Protection of Human Life and Freedom 
 
  It must be emphasized that there exists no clear division between these two 
values. A person seized by terrorists or other “roving” or “stationary” bandits finds 
himself or herself in conditions that clearly threaten his or her life or dramatically 
lower the quality of life. 
                                                 
14 At present, the conditional human life value in the USA amounts to 3 million USD. 
15 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_hostages_in_Iraq 
   10 
  The level of protection can be defined as a value inversely related to the level 
of threats to life and freedom. Let us define the following levels of threats and list 
them in descending order.  
1.  A period of mass repressions, starvation, epidemics or war in a totalitarian 
State;  
2.  A totalitarian State in a “stationary” condition;  
3.  The same is true with the emergence of a small stratum of privileged 
individuals who cannot be subjected to arrest or execution without recourse to 
extremely involved procedures.  
4.  Same as above, but with a wide circle of privileged groups in an authoritarian 
state (but with the freedom  to travel abroad, limitations on the activity of 
opposition politicians and print media); 
5.  The Government’s power is restricted by a Constitution (see definition above) 
and an independent judiciary (i.e. the authorities can  and do  lose a case in 
court). The situation is  characterized by the presence of  universal rights: 
personal immunity, the presumption of innocence with independent courts of 
justice and competitive court proceedings;  
6.  Same as above, but the Government’s power is additionally restricted by a 
competitive political system (democracy) with a powerful and independent 
mass media (a competitive media market).  
It is evident that there exist numerous intermediate levels. It is also evident that only a 
tiny number of extremely profitable projects with very short periods of recoupment 
can be attractive at level (1). As  we  move to the subsequent levels, the  types of 
projects that can be reasonably  implemented (in terms of cost and recoupment time) 
increase.   
It follows that the necessary condition for economic growth is a progressive 
reduction in the level of threats to life and freedom of a person. We have witnessed 
this process in China in recent decades (with an interval caused by the events of 1989). 
It is also clear that (as has been noted by Olson) that as projects become more time 
consuming and transactions more intricate, guarantees must be at Level 6 levels. For 
example, in China this problem has been solved to some extent by unofficially 












The Rise and Decline of a Totalitarian State Economy 
 – the Case of the USSR  
M. Olson (2000, pp. 100, 129) analyzed the causes and sources of the relative 
efficiency of  the Stalinist economic model. He came to the conclusion that regular 
mass repressions of special interest groups ensured transparency of the administrative 
system for the dictator. However, Olson does not offer an answer to the question as to 
why the Stalinists themselves rejected such an efficient model almost immediately   11 
after the tyrant’s death. The Stalinist elite required that their own personal safety and 
inviolability be increased, which can explain the rapid abandonment of  the Stalinist 
model. The price paid for these guarantees of safety and inviolability was the gradual 
growth and  increasing power  of special interest groups (Olson, 2000, Chapter 8) 
within governing agencies and those wielding power, which resulted in a progressive 
sclerosis of the system.  
 
Statistical analysis 
A. Przevorski ( Przevorski et al, 2000) shows
16 that in absence of  peculiar 
advantages that would tend to affect economic growth, democracies exhibit a higher 
stability in terms of growth rates than do dictatorships.   
It is equally apparent that the overwhelming majority of rich countries are 
democratic. Thus, it inevitably becomes necessary to test the hypothesis that in the 
historical very long run period (in excess of 100 years – VLR), a democratic regime 
(or to be more precise, a rule-of-law  –  RoL  democracy) (see  Mau, Yanovskiy, 
Zhavoronkov et al., 2003) will exhibit a positive statistical connection to growth rates 
of per-capita GDP.   
Also a 180-year period offers considerably more possibilities for analyzing 
the  existence of  cause-effect relationships between democratic institutions and 
economic growth.  
Of course, our analysis is by no means “proof” of democracy’s advantages, 
and does not claim to be so. The statistical illustration presented below, which is 
actually a rough draft (due to the numerous “re-establishments” of missing data with a 
weakening of the connection
17), demonstrates the presence of  a  clear and strong 
relationship between a number of variables.   
The obtained interrelationships  do not allow for the rejection of the 
hypothesis that a rule-of-law democracy  provides advantages when compare to all 
alternative  types of  regime in  the historical very long run; the  available data is 
insufficient for such a conclusion.   
Data 
The statistical data (the values of per-capita GDP) are taken from the works 
of M. Maddison (Maddison, 2001, 2003). The values are summarized in Annex 3.   
The Oil Monarchies are not included in the sample (the nineteenth – century 
data missing in M. Maddison’s works were not “reconstructed”) because of the 
undesirability to complicate the model by the introduction of yet another variable.    
The duration of the regime of rule-of law democracy in a country was 
determined on the basis of data found in Freedom House, Przevorski (Przevorski et al, 
2000), Tanin-Lvov (Tanin-Lvov, 2001) and in a number of sources used for collecting 
the data for Annex 2. 
At the same time, it becomes apparent that there exists an  incomplete 
comparability of the rule-of-law regime as, for example, in the case of England of the 
1890s and that of the majority of Latin American democracies in the first half of the 
20
th century (not in favor of the latter). A number of apparent problems or failures 
                                                 
16 He analyzes the forty year period 1950-90 based on a sample of 100 countries.  
17 That is, so as not to artificially strengthen the interdependence.    12 
were taken into account, (although roughly), by singling out the following conditions 
of democracy:   
(?) a rule-of-law democratic state (RoL Democracy);  
b) a rule-of-law state with elements of democracy (RoL&DemElements);  
c)  basics of a democratic regime with elements of the rule of law  
(Dem_basis&RoLelements),  
d) a non-liberal democracy (IllibDemocracy) 
The available data on a large number of countries and on practically all large 
worlds’ regions (which makes it possible to approximately estimate the intervals of the 
initial per-capita GDP for another several scores of countries), presented by M. 
Maddison, have made it possible to perform these estimations with respect  to 145 
countries.  
There is no GDP data on many countries for the 19
th century. Where GDP 
data for a backward and undemocratic country was unavailable, we used the per-capita 
GDP index for the year 1820 at a minimum level for this category of countries (the 
region according Maddison).  
For countries  where democratic rule has existed for decades, maximum 
assessments were used for a particular region. For countries “less mature” in this 
respect, or those with only few years of democratic experience during the period 1820-
2000, we chose the minimum level. This resulted in a reduction of the average rate of 
growth of per-capita GDP for democracies, and an increase of same for authoritarian 
countries (in order to not overestimate the significance of democracy
18.) In other 
words, the “reconstructed” data inevitably reduces the explanatory capacity of the 
model.   
The total number of countries in the sample is 149, including the regional 
data application for the relatively young countries (values of GDP for 1820). Of that 
number, the data of 100 countries have been “reconstructed” by respective regions’ 
data.    
The most common problems and failures of democracies noted (apart from 
the failure to sustain a rule-of-law regime or to protect the basic individual rights (Rule 
of Law) [**see original] were :  
•  an inability to change the Government (political competition failure); 
•  problems with fair and equal representation and with voter registration procedures;  
A taxpayer democracy offers no less a guarantee of political competition than 
a democracy based on the universal suffrage. Representation (franchise) could be 
legally achievable and legally universal as well. At the same time, taxpayer democracy 
is free from a number of well-known and well-described moral problems arising when 
Mr B, Mr C and Mr D  decide that Mr A is obliged to help Mr E, and when there exist 
appropriate incentives for uncooperative behavior of voters, elected politicians, and 
bureaucrats. The incentives include an uncontrollable desire to redistribute the 
benefits, to boost the functions and powers of the State, which would  result in a 
decline in the quality of public benefits provided thereby, and would undermine the 
guarantees of individual rights and freedoms. No moral problems concerning fair 
representation would emerge when only those are entitled to vote who have paid taxes 
in excess of a certain established threshold, irrespective of any other parameters 
(religion, race, gender, place of residence). Problems would emerge when some of the 
                                                 
18 Naturally, this has overrated the significance of initial GDP for further growth, because in an absolute 
majority of cases, countries with an experience of democracy have significantly higher rates of growth than 
non-democratic countries during the 180-year period under discussion.    13 
taxpayers have the right to vote while others are deprived of this right or are restricted 
in its exercise by an extremely uneven parceling out of electoral districts (a typical 
example is England before the 1832 Reform Act).    
The impressive centuries of experience of self-organization accumulated by 
Jewish communities in Europe is taken into account in the following  manner: the 
preceding taxpayer democracy index is set for the state Israel at 100 years.   
Data set for the statistical analysis presented in Annex 1. 
 
3.2.2. Variables  
Table 1. 
 
?   Variables’ designation   Variables’ description  
1.  GDPavgrowth  Average rates of per-capita GDP growth for the 
period of 1820-2000 
2.  StartGDP  Per-capita income at beginning of period – 1820 
3.  DemocrTaxp  Duration of period of taxpayer democracy  
4.  RoL Democracy  The duration the RoL period in a country 
(including the period of democracy based on the 
universal right of suffrage, despite the apparent 
injustice of the latter): USA, England after 1832, 
the Third Republic in France prior to 1940, etc. 
(supreme executive authority can lose a judicial 
cause, or can be removed as a result of elections, 
etc.)  
5.  RoL&DemElements  A RoL state with elements of democracy (England 
prior to 1832, Holland in the 17
th and 18
th 
centuries, the July Monarchy in France) has turned 
out to be a rare type.  
“Elements” mean regular elections, Parliament 
with considerable powers (taxes, budget), and 
political competition. However, not all taxpayers 
may vote, or the representation of voters is unfair 
and may differ by one order of magnitude and 
more   
6.  Dem_basis&RoLelements  The basics of a democratic regime with elements 
of an RoL state (e.g., Russia, Ukraine and 
Romania in the 1990s; such regimes exist mainly 
in backward countries and last typically more than 
one term of office); it is the most widespread form 
of democracy in underdeveloped countries    
7.  IllibDemocracy  The basics of a democratic regime with universal 
suffrage, as a rule, without visible elements of 
RoL (e.g., Venezuela in the period from the 
beginning of Hugo Chavez’s presidency up until 
the introduction, by him, of the “one-party rule” of 
the United Socialist Party of Venezuela; the short 
lived attempts at democratic rule in African 
countries)  
8.  RestrictGovt  Any restrictions imposed on the State (or 
Government) by a law, or by a court decision, or   14 
by political competition (the sum of years in rows 
4, 5, 6, 7)  
9.  “Relig_Peace” (Not-
ethic_monotheism) 
“Non-ethical monotheism” or simply the 
“Religion of Peace” – Islam as a predominant 
religion in a country 
11.  Judeo-protest  The predominance of Judeo-Christian values in 
the period of development of democracy 
12.   Polity IV, P4  The variable constructed through the use of the 
PolityIV data set.  
Polity IV = DEMOC – AUTOC + 10 
DEMOC and AUTOC are variables constructed in 
Polity IV  
 
 
In order to reduce the significance of subjective assessments, the period of 
relatively democratic development was divided into 4 categories (variables 4-7). The 
overall duration of such a period (when  the State’s power was restricted both by 
formal legislation as well as by enforcement practices) was taken into account in the 
statistical analysis, and the results thus obtained were significant as well.  
 
 Causality Analysis 
In regression analysis, statistically significant relationships between variables 
do not answer the question of the direction of the influence exerted by variables on one 
another, i.e. causality.   
For data which is “time series” by its very nature, there exists the Granger 
(1969) approach which attempts to help determine whether the variables influence one 
another. The Granger test indicates to what extent the current values of Y can be 
explained by the previous values of Y, and shows whether the values of X with one or 
another lags improve the current explanation of Y.    
It is believed that variable X is the Granger-cause for Y if X helps to improve 
the explanation of Y.  
To test Granger-causality we run the following regressions:   
 
(1)  Y = c0+c1Yt-1+…+cnYt-n + k1Xt-1+…+knXt-n+et,   
(2)  X = d0+d1Yt-1+…+dnYt-n + l1Xt-1+…+lnXt-n+et. 
 
For the first equation, F-statistics are the Wald statistics for the hypothesis of 
the simultaneous equality to 0: k1 = k2 = … = kn = 0. The zero-hypothesis is as follows: 
X IS NOT the Granger-cause of Y. I.e., the values of variable X taken with a certain 
lag do not influence the current value of variable Y.  
We believe that X is the Granger-cause of Y if, on the one hand, it is possible 
to reject the hypothesis that X is not the Granger-cause of Y (i.e. coefficients k in 
regression (1) significantly differ from 0), and, on the other hand, it is impossible to 
reject the hypothesis that Y is not the Granger-cause of X ( i.e. coefficients d in 
regression (2) cannot be differentiated from 0 at the required level of significance).    
We have used Granger causality tests in order to assess the causality direction of RoL 
(Rule of Law) variables and the rates of economic growth in the period 1820-2003.     15 
On the basis of data regarding the size of population of European counties and by 
using the RoL variable for each of these countries, we constructed the RoL_TOTAL1 
variable
19 for 12 European countries by assessing the RoL of every country according 
to its population.  
In the Granger test performed on a model with two-year lags, we observe the 
causality direction from RoL to economic growth (i.e. we can reject the zero-
hypothesis at the 1% level of significance) and, conversely, we do not observe the 
causality direction from the rates of economic growth to RoL (i.e. we cannot reject the 
hypothesis of all the coefficients being equal to zero, [**meaning unclear] under rates 
of economic growth taken with certain lags, as regards their influence on RoL).   
The same result is observed in the model with 5 lags. That is, RoL is the 
Granger-cause for the rates of economic growth.  
The results of models assessed with 10 and 15 lags. In these cases it is safe to 
say that there exists  a  mutual influence between RoL and the rates of economic 
growth.   
We obtained similar results regarding causality with data relating to rates of 
economic growth and variables constructed on the Polity IV data base.  
Assessment of models with short lags show the direction of Granger-
causality is from RoL to high rates of economic growth. When the lags are increased, 
there remains only the mutual influence of variables.   
However, if the 30’s and 40’s of the 20
th century are excluded from the 
period under study, we find that short-term dependence is preserved in the causality 
direction from RoL to  high rates of economic growth. In models with longer lags, 
however, the influence of rates of economic growth on RoL weakens. [**see original]  
In the models with variables based on the Polity IY data causality remains in 
evidence in the short run, while with the exclusion of the 30’s and 40’s of the 20
th 
century, the relationship between RoL and economic growth looses significance in 
models with a large number of lags.   
When analyzing causality direction between the Restricted Government 
variables (RG) and the rates of economic growth, it is possible to f ind another 
causality direction (differing from that observed for European countries).   
For 15  Latin American
20  countries, as well as  for countries with longer 
statistical rows of economic growth (for Salvador, Nicaragua and a number of other 
countries, such statistics are available beginning with the 1920’s) models with small 
number of lags display no significant relationships. 
At the same time, when additional lags are included in the model, the 
emergence of a Granger-causality direction from rates of economic growth to RG 
variable is observed.  
We have analyzed the causality direction between the Restricted Government 
variable and the rates of economic growth for individual countries of Eastern Europe. 
(We considered countries with GDP data sets available for  the past  50 years, in 
particular, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia (Czechia and Slovakia).   
With regards to Hungary, one cannot deny the  absence  of  a  causality 
relationship direction from the RG variable to the rate of economic growth.  
                                                 
19 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the UK. 
20 GDP_Bolivia, GDP_Costa Rica, GDP_Cuba, GDP_Dominican Republic, GDP_Ecuador, GDP_El Salvador, GDP_Guatemala, 
GDP_Haïti, GDP_Honduras, GDP_Jamaica, GDP_Nicaragua, GDP_Panama, GDP_Paraguay, GDP_Puerto Rico, GDP_Trinidad and 
Tobago   16 
A similar causality direction is obtained when using the variable based on the 
Polity IV data.  
For all models – both those where use is made of the Restricted Government 
variable, as well as those where the variable based on the Polity IV data is used – the 
hypothesis of the existence of Granger-causality directed from institutional variables 
(Restricted Government or Polity IV) to the rates of economic growth cannot be 
rejected. 
The very same conclusions regarding  Hungary can be made with regard to 
Czechia and Slovakia, both in terms of the Restricted Government variables and the 
Polity IV variable.  
When applying similar models to Bulgaria, it is apparent that the hypothesis 
that the variables influence each other, with a certain lag, at a sufficiently high level of 
significance, can be rejected. That is, the values of the RG variable in previous periods 
do not influence the rates of economic growth at the present moment.   
However, Granger-causality manifests itself in models with more than 5 lags 
tested on a sample where per-capita GDP is more than 2000. [**meaning unclear – 
does this refer to Bulgaria?] 
 
Comments 
The duration of a RoL regime is explained by the initial level of GDP, the 
presence of Judeo-Protestant values, and the experience of  a  taxpayer democracy 
(Dependency 7, Table 2), as well as by the predominance of Islam (negatively) in 
combination with taxpayer democracy (positively) (Dependency 8, Table 2).  
On the basis of the foregoing we can considerably augment Przevorski and 
his colleagues’  observation that dictatorships, while demonstrating more frequent 
periods of considerably higher economic growth than democracies, also cause equally 
spectacular economic collapses, i.e. that they demonstrate economic growth instability. 
Even where democracy does not demonstrate any economically measurable 
advantages over a forty-year period under observation, it still ensures higher rates of 
long-term (150-200 years and more) economic growth due to the long-term stability it 
provides.  
The long-term period of observation alleviates the problem of comparability 
regarding the technical conditions of economic growth. Recent decades, characterized 
by acceleration of technological progress,  have provided higher rates of economic 
growth. However, it is true that this factor has also decreased the relative significance 
of democracy as a factor of growth. Technological progress, is conducive to 
acceleration of economic growth in any country which  avails itself of its 
achievements.  The typical tendency  of institutionally backward countries to  adopt 
innovations is largely compensated for by the incomparably lower costs of access to 
the results of research and development, even where these results are legally acquired. 
Frequently,  such advancements are acquired  in such countries  by way of theft of 
intellectual property rights. Thus, even projects with a short period of recoupment and 
small sensitivity for failure in protecting property rights, can be implemented with 
significantly greater efficiency, which result in the acceleration of economic growth.  
The acceleration of scientific and technological progress in the 20
th century 
has influenced the rate of economic growth (the average annual rate of 1% was quite 
satisfactory in the 19
th century, while long-term rates of growth during periods of 
peace in the 20
th century  have exceeded 3%). This factor could grant a significant 
advantage to a democracy based on the universal right of suffrage over a taxpayer 
democracy in a comparative analysis of these two institutions. For this reason we have   17 
not conducted such an analysis in the present study, although we consider the 
difference between the two institutions to be very significant.   
An historical analysis of the source of investments is another very significant 
factor reducing the possibility of demonstrating the importance of a democratic regime 
and one or another set of legal norms for economic growth. 
As opposed to more backward parts of the world, countries which  can be 
considered to have achieved “ developed” status by the middle to the end of the 19
th 
century were characterized by their experience of a Rule-of-Law State and democratic 
rule. These countries, the majority of which were Protestant, became the source of 
investment in the broadest sense – from finance to knowledge and human capital – for 
the rest of the world.   
This capital was not, to be sure, used efficiently in all countries and regions. 
It is apparent, nevertheless, that the success achieved by  various  eastern Asian 
countries,  none of  which have ever  experienced democracy, or have become 
democratic only recently, is the result of the efficient use of capital from developed 
countries. Clearly no active trade balance between these countries and Europe or North 
America would have been possible without the investments or the necessary know-
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1.  GDPavgrowth  Democr&RoL  0.549  145  7.863  0.297 
2  GDPavgrowth  RestrictGovt  0.582  145  8.567  0.335 
3.  GDPavgrowth  StartGDP  0.333  49  2.420  0.092 
4.  Democr&RoL  DemocrTaxp  0.869  145  20.970  0.753 
5.  Democr&RoL  StartGDP  0.808  49  9.412  0.646 
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The successes of authoritarian modernizations, as  demonstrated by 
Przevorski and his colleagues (Przevorski et al, 2000), are unreliable achievements 
(even for the period of 1950-90), because a period of rapid growth can be followed by 
periods of profound and lengthy slumps. The economic successes of authoritarian 
regimes are much more sensitive to political shocks (due simply to the lower level 
stability of such regimes as compared to legal democracies). Such regimes are less 
stable and robust in comparison to democracies, all appearances of power and   18 
stability notwithstanding. It is this factor which made a mockery of the forecasts 
of almost all sovietologists.      
The results of our research covering the period 1 820-2000 confirm the 
hypothesis that, in the long run, rule-of-law democracy provides conditions for much 
higher rates of economic growth.  More importantly,  such regimes  demonstrate an 
ability to export capital, knowledge and, in rare cases (where political will exists), 
even efficient institutions,  thereby  stimulating the growth of global economy as a 
whole. Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (Nazi Germany, USSR, PRC) export 
only war, starvation, and economic collapse, or, at best, make up for the failures of 
their vassals by paying for their loyalty from their own internal resources (USSR in the 
post-Stalinist period).   
The hypothesis  regarding Causality direction could  not be rejected. (RoL 
Democracy provides the best guarantees of private property and  thus the best 
framework for private investment and economic growth).  
Our analysis supports the hypothesis  regarding the ability of RoL 
Democracies to provide the best framework for VLR economic growth. RoL 
Democracies induce economic growth throughout the world by the export of capital, 
knowledge  and institutions, just as Autocracies export only inefficient institutions 
(USSR to Central and Easter European countries, China etc.) and war. Even the supply 
of free oil and gas, weapons and educational services to allied states proved to be 
inefficient.  
Private property  can be  said to be  protected only if  a  person’s life and 
immunity (liberty) is guaranteed. A regime where an independent court system and 
opposition media (this term being defined quite formally) exist provides much more 
favorable conditions  for economic growth  in post-communist countries, as long as 
stable voter demand for such institutions exists over an extended period so that 
such values become deeply-rooted and broadly shared in a given society. This in 
turn should lead to  a  constitutional basis  for the above  in terms  of formal 
legislation, as well as informal societal standards.   
The advantages of a Rule of Law Democracy are rooted in the due guaranties 
of  personal immunity.  Such provisions  must be  potent enough to  guarantee the 
immunity  even of a person whose religious faith  is at odds with the government or 
someone who  is critical of  government. The  level of personal immunity guaranties 
described  above  is the necessary condition for  the effective  protection of  private 
property and for the VLR economic prosperity of the citizenry. 
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